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MICHIGAN v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY THE POWER OF EPA IN
CURING THE DIFFICULTY DOWNWIND
I. INTRODUCTION
Responding to growing concern over ozone migration across
state lines and its effects on the ability of Northeastern and Mid-
Atlantic states to meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS), Congress enacted subchapter I of the Clean Air Act
(CAA) in 1990.1 Accordingly, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has called for more rigorous emissions standards in
twenty-two states and the District of Columbia.2 In an attempt to
alleviate the interstate transport of ozone, EPA mandated that these
states submit revised State Implementation Plans (SIPs) containing
provisions that prevent nonattainment of NAAQS in downwind
states.
3
1. See Federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,
§§ 101-11, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-767lq
(1994)) [hereinafter CAA] (setting forth regulations prescribing primary and sec-
ondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards [hereinafter NAAQS] for six ma-
jor pollutants, including nitrogen oxide [hereinafter NO.] recognized for its
ability to be transported by wind across state lines thereby exacerbating ozone
problems in downwind states); see alsoJaime Larman, Comparing Apples to Oranges?
EPA Faces Difficulties in Bringing to Fruition an Emissions Trading Program For NOx, 6
ENVrL. LAw. 603 (2000) (discussing long-range effects of ozone); Shari DeSalvo,
Note, Ozone Transport And The Clean Air Act: The Answers Are Blowin'In The Wind, 46
CLEV. ST. L. Rxv. 355, 356 (1998) (discussing congressional intent behind 1990
Amendments to CAA with respect to ozone transport). For a further discussion of
ozone transport, see infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
CAA is a federal law under which the Environmental Protection Agency [here-
inafter EPA] sets limits on the amount of air pollutants permitted anywhere within
the United States. See EPA OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, The
Plain English Guide To The Clean Air Act, available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/
oaqps/peg-caa/pegcaa02.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2001). NAAQS are EPA-im-
posed standards that every state must meet in order to control and limit pollutants
in the United States that pose risk to public health, welfare and the environment.
See id. For a further discussion on NAAQS, see infra notes 21-26 and accompanying
text. Because forms of pollution, such as ozone, can be transported across state
lines via wind and weather patterns, many states have been unable to meet
NAAQS. See Larman, supra note 1, at 603-5.
2. See Larman, supra note 1, at 603 (discussing measures EPA has taken to
combat ozone transport); see also Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (discussing EPA action to mandate twenty-three jurisdictions revise their
State Implementation Plans [hereinafter SIPs] in order to mitigate ozone
transport).
3. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States
in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Re-
(93)
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In Michigan v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,4 the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals addressed EPA's stat-
utory authority to police SIPs. 5 Based on its statutory interpretation
gional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,398 (Oct. 27, 1998) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75 & 96) [hereinafter Final Rule] (calling for twenty-two
states and District of Columbia to submit SIP revisions); see also Michigan, 213 F.3d
at 669 (discussing EPA Final Rule).
A SIP is a set of regulations adopted and implemented by a state that provides
for the maintenance and enforcement of NAAQS. See EPA Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards, The Plain English Guide To The Clean Air Act, available at
http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/peg-caa/pegcaa2.html (last visited Feb.6, 2001).
A nonattainment area is defined as a geographical region "in which the level of
criteria air pollutant is higher than the level allowed by federal standards." EPA
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, The Plain English Guide To The Clean
Air Act, available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/peg-caa/pegcaalO.html (last
visited Feb.6, 2001).
4. 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
5. See id. This Note addresses one of three key issues in Part I of the Michigan
decision. Specifically, this Note addresses EPA's construction of significant contri-
bution with respect to the following sub-issues: (1) whether EPA unlawfully over-
rode past precedent with respect to significant contribution; (2) whether EPA's
consideration of the cost involved in reducing NO, emissions violated CAA
§ 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I); (3) whether EPA's Uniform Controls scheme was arbitrary
and capricious; and (4) whether EPA's construction of CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I)
violated the nondelegation doctrine. See Michigan 213 F.3d at 669, 674-82. The
Michigan court rejected the two remaining issues in Part I. See id. at 669, 671-74.
Though not discussed in this Note, these issues included a determination of
whether EPA is permitted to call for SIP revisions without convening a transport
commission, whether EPA failed to carry out an adequately state-specific determi-
nation of ozone contribution and whether EPA properly construed significant con-
tribution under CAA § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). See id.
Part II of the Michigan decision addressed whether EPA properly included
Wisconsin, Missouri, Georgia and South Carolina in its SIP call. See id. at 681-85.
Ultimately, the court determined that EPA's inclusion of Wisconsin, Missouri and
Georgia was improper. See id. Additionally, in Part III the Michigan court rejected
the claim that EPA violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act and impermissibly in-
fringed on the rights of states to design their SIPs. See Michigan 213 F.3d at 670,
685-89.
In Part IV, the Michigan court addressed four issues. See id. at 670, 689-95.
The court first considered whether "EPA arbitrarily revised the definition of 'NOX
budget unit."' Id. at 670-89. The Michigan court rejected this claim. See id. at 670,
690. The second issue involved several challenges by the Council of Industrial
Boilers, asserting that: (1) EPA's SIP call was arbitrary and capricious based on
EPA's failure to determine whether non-electricity generating units [hereinafter
non-EGUs] were significant contributors; (2) EPA employed flawed cost assump-
tions in cost-effective control measures for non-EGU budgets; (3) EPA erroneously
calculated non-EGU budgets; and (4) EPA arbitrarily redefined the term "EGU."
See id. at 690-92. The Michigan court rejected all of the claims raised by the Coun-
cil of Industrial Boilers except for the claim challenging EPA's change in the defi-
nition of EGU. See id. at 670, 693.
The third issue in Part IV involved two claims asserted by the Interstate Natu-
ral Gas Association of America [hereinafter INGA]. See id. at 693-94. The Michigan
court upheld the first claim that, in determining state NO, budgets, EPA failed to
give adequate notice and opportunity for comment on the control level for large
stationary internal combustion engines in determining state NO. budgets. See id.
at 670, 693. The Michigan court, however, rejected INGA's second claim that EPA
2
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of CAA section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), the Michigan court ruled that
EPA was within its statutory authority when it required twenty-two
states and the District of Columbia to revise their SIPs by reducing
nitrogen oxide (NO,) emissions by amounts that could be removed
for $2,000 dollars or less per ton in order to alleviate ozone
transport. 6
This Note examines the statutory authority of EPA concerning
section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) and considers the holding of the Michi-
gan court with respect to EPA's legal authority to regulate NO,
emissions based on cost considerations. Section II of this Note be-
gins with a brief summary of the facts of Michigan.7 Section III
surveys the underlying principles behind section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i)
(I) and explains the relevant case law surrounding the statute.8
Section IV discusses the Michigan court's analysis of relevant case
law and statutory language. 9 Section V evaluates whether the Michi-
gan court's analysis was proper.1 0 Finally, section VI of this Note
considers the impact of the Michigan court's holding in regard to
EPA's authority under section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I). 1
II. FACTS
In October 1998, EPA published its Final Rule mandating that
twenty-two states and the District of Columbia revise their SIPs to
failed to follow its own standards in defining internal combustion engines. See id.
at 670, 693-94.
The Michigan court also rejected the fourth and final claim raised in Part IV
and asserted by PP&L, an electric utility company owning several generating sta-
tions in Pennsylvania, claiming EPA arbitrarily limited the number of "early reduc-
tion credits" and that EPA incorrectly required "low mass emission units" to apply
a fifteen percent multiplier in calculating emissions. See id. at 669, 694-95.
6. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 669 (holding EPA decision did not supersede its
statutory authority); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1994) (requiring
SIPs include provisions prohibiting emissions activities that prevent nonattainment
of other state's NAAQS); Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (requiring
twenty-two states and District of Columbia to revise SIPs by reducing NO, emissions
by amounts capable of being removed for $2,000 dollars or less per ton).
7. For a further discussion of the facts of Michigan, see infra notes 12-20 and
accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of the underlying principles behind CAA
§ 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) and relevant case law, see infra notes 21-74 and accompany-
ing text.
9. For a further discussion of the Michigan court's analysis of relevant case law
and the statutory language of CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), see infra notes 75-109
and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the propriety of the Michigan court's analysis,
see infra notes 110-61 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the impact of the Michigan court's decision
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reduce NO,, emissions (an ozone precursor) and ozone transport
across state lines.12 EPA required each state to establish controls
capable of eliminating NO,, emissions at a cost of $2,000 dollars or
less per ton.13 In making its initial determination of which states
were significant contributors to ozone pollution, EPA considered
the "magnitude, frequency, and relative amount of each state's
ozone contribution to a nonattainment area. ' 14 Although EPA ap-
plied a low threshold in its determination of how much ozone
would constitute a significant contribution under section
7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), EPA decided that twenty-three regions need
only eliminate a portion of their contribution by reducing ozone
levels "by the amount achievable with 'highly cost-effective con-
trols.' "1 Accordingly, once a state was nominally deemed a signifi-
cant contributor, it could satisfy section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) by
reducing its NO, emissions using controls capable of removing
those emissions for $2,000 dollars or less per ton. 16 Under EPA's
interpretation, the labeling of a state as a significant contributor
hinges on the differences in the costs of reducing NO, emissions in
each state. 17 Thus, EPA ultimately sought to uniformly limit NO.
12. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,356 (requiring twenty-three jurisdictions
to adopt and submit SIP revisions that provide for adequate prohibition of emis-
sions which significantly contribute to nonattainment in downwind states); see also
Michigan, 213 F.3d at 669. The states required to amend their SIPs were Alabama,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and
Wisconsin. See id.
13. See Michigan 213 F.3d at 669. Because EPA's Final Rule permits ton-for-
ton emissions trading among firms based on state allowances, it is likely that firms
with the greatest emission reduction costs will buy up allowances from firms with
lower reduction costs because these firms over-controlled their NO, emissions. See
id. at 676.
14. Id. at 675. In one calculation, EPA examined the number of NO, parts
per billion [hereinafter ppb] that a contributing state's emissions produced in
downwind locations. See id. The court went on to state that Indiana was deemed a
significant contributor to nonattainment in New York because it contributed "at
least two ppb to four percent of the one-hour ozone exceedance in New York City."
Id. Yet, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Tennessee
and Missouri were not classified as states that contribute significantly to New York
City nonattainment since they did not contribute more than two ppb to a one-hour
exceedance. See id.
15. Id. at 675 (citing Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,403).
16. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 675 (discussing EPA's threshold of contribution);
see also Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,403 (mandating twenty-three regions revise
their SIPs to mitigate ozone transport).
17. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,403 (stating that "'significance,' whether
measured in volume of Nosubx [sic] emitted or arriving in nonattainment areas,
would vary from state to state depending on variations in cutback costs.").
4
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emissions in these states by an amount that could be achieved for
less than $2,000 dollars per ton.18
Because EPA based its decision on cost considerations rather
than "amounts of pollutants" as provided in section
7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), numerous petitions for review were filed dis-
puting EPA's Final Rule for twenty-three SIPs.19 Looking to both
the language of the statute and the intent of Congress, the D.C.
Circuit determined that EPA is not barred from considering costs
in its application of section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I).20
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act, last amended in 1990, provides a compre-
hensive program for controlling NAAQS for ozone via state and
federal regulation.21 Pursuant to CAA, EPA is responsible for estab-
lishing NAAQS and for identifying primary and secondary sources
of air pollution that compromise public health and welfare.22 Fol-
lowing EPA's promulgation of NAAQS, each state is required to
adopt and submit a SIP that provides for the implementation, main-
18. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 675 (discussing EPA's reasoning that twenty-
three jurisdictions would uniformly make modest emissions reductions by cutting
back emissions by amounts that could be eliminated using "highly cost-effective
controls.").
19. See id. at 669. The Michigan court explained that the "gamble" of the
smaller contributors is that if EPA were prohibited from taking costs into account,
they would not be included in EPA's SIP call. See id. at 675. For a complete discus-
sion of Petitioner's challenges to EPA's Final Rule, see infra notes 75-101 and ac-
companying text.
20. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 679 (citing its holding in Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter NRDC]
(stating Petitioners provided no evidence of clear congressional intent to bar EPA
from considering costs in making its determination); see also NRDC, 824 F.2d at
1163 (holding "clear congressional intent to preclude costs" must exist).
21. See Larman, supra note 1, at 604 (discussing purpose and history behind
42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01- 76 7 lq (1994)); see also DeSalvo, supra note 1, at 356 (discussing
goal of CAA).
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1994) (mandating NAAQS stipulate maxi-
mum permitted concentrations of harmful air pollutants). CAA sets forth two
types of NAAQS called primary standards and secondary standards. See id. Primary
standards are established to protect public health, including children, the elderly
and those populations whose health conditions render them particularly suscepti-
ble to harm from unhealthy levels of air pollution. See EPA Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards, National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), available
at http://www.epa.gov/airs/criteria.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2001). Secondary
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tenance and enforcement of NAAQS. 23 Once a SIP is approved,
EPA may subsequently call for plan revisions if it determines the SIP
is inadequate to attain NAAQS. 24
Under the 1990 CAA Amendments, SIPs must contain provi-
sions prohibiting emissions within a state from contributing signifi-
cantly to nonattainment of NAAQS in another state. 25 This
amendment reflects Congress' recognition that both ozone and its
precursors can be transported great distances by wind and weather
patterns, thereby affecting the ability of downwind states to attain
NAAQS. 26
Although the 1990 CAA Amendments attempted to reduce
ozone transport by establishing ambient air quality standards, EPA
continued to struggle with how to diminish levels of pollution
throughout vast portions of the nation. 27 Section 7 410(a)(2)(D)
(i) (I) requires SIPs to contain adequate provisions that prohibit
"any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will contribute signifi-
cantly to nonattainment in ... any other State with respect to any
such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) (1994) (mandating states adopt and
submit SIPs for primary and secondary NAAQS which contain adequate provisions
prohibiting emissions activity within each state from "contribut[ing] significantly
to nonattainment" in any other state). In developing SIPs, states must conduct
public hearings, providing the public with opportunities to comment and utilize
federally funded scientific research, expert studies, engineering plans, and money.
See EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, The Plain English Guide To
The Clean Air Act, available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/peg-caa/peg-
caa02.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2001).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k) (5) (1994) (requiring that SIPs impose controls
upon allowable emissions levels generated from sources within state).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) (1994) (mandating SIPs prohibit any
source or emissions activity from emitting "any air pollutant which will .. . contrib-
ute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by any other
state with respect to any such primary or secondary ambient air quality standard.").
26. See DeSalvo, supra note 1, at 356-61 (discussing ozone transport). Ozone
is formed naturally in the atmosphere by complex "light-driven reactions" involv-
ing emitted volatile organic compounds [hereinafter VOCs], such as NO., which
react in the presence of sunlight. See id. at 356-57; see also Larman, supra note 1, at
605-06 (discussing ozone formation).
27. See Larman, supra note 1, at 603 (discussing challenge of reducing ambi-
ent levels of ozone for large segments of nation).
6
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.... ")28 Congress, however, failed to define for EPA the amount of
pollutant sufficient to deem a state a significant contributor. 29
B. Effects of Ozone Transport on Nonattainment
Due to weather patterns that cause emissions from industrial-
ized areas of the South and Midwest to flow north across state lines,
ozone transportation affects the ability of Northeastern and Mid-
Atlantic states to attain NAAQS. 30 Long-range effects of ozone
transport have resulted in regional disputes over ozone pollution
and its precursors. 31 In light of the regional conflicts surrounding
ozone transport, EPA exercised its delegated authority under CAA
to promulgate stricter emissions regulations.3 2 Accordingly, EPA
called for more rigorous emissions requirements in twenty-three re-
gions for NO,, a precursor to ozone found to cause serious health
problems.3 3
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) (1994). The 1990 CAA Amendments are
aimed at strengthening the objectives of the earlier 1977 Amendments, ensuring
that one state could not impose its pollution on another state and requiring states
to adopt more stringent regulations to maintain clean air. See DeSalvo, supra note
1, at 371 (citing S. REP. No. 101-228, at 19 (1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3495 (1990)) (stating purpose behind 1977 CAA Amendments).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) (1994) (setting forth SIPs require-
ments); see also Michigan, 213 F.3d at 697 (Sentelle,J., dissenting) (discussing Con-
gress' failure to define both "significant contribution" and "amount").
30. See Larman, supra note 1, at 608-10. Due to factors such as weather pat-
terns, topography and dense sources of pollution located east of the Continental
Divide, ozone transport has a more significant impact on air quality in the Eastern
portion of the United States. See id. Ozone pollution is exacerbated by stagnant
air masses that facilitate ozone expansion in the atmosphere. See DeSalvo, supra
note 1, at 357. When these air masses spread downwind, they tend to accumulate
over urban areas along the East Coast, increasing in levels of ozone as they move
farther north. See id.
31. See Larman, supra note 1, at 608-10. Disputes have recently arisen because
of the severe burden ozone flows and emissions from pollutant sources in industri-
alized areas of the South and Midwest place upon Northeastern states, making it
difficult for many Northeastern states to attain NAAQS. See id.; see also DeSalvo,
supra note 1, at 357 (stating ozone pollution can be problematic in non-industrial
areas of Eastern United States).
32. See Larman, supra note 1, at 610 (discussing EPA's recent regulatory ac-
tion against ozone transport).
33. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,515 (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 51.121 (a) (2), (c), 96.1 (1999)) (calling for twenty-three regions to submit SIP
revisions containing measures that ensure reductions in NO, emission levels that
will not impede NAAQS attainment in downwind states); see also Michigan, 213
F.3d at 669 (discussing EPA's Final Rule mandate that twenty-two states and District
of Columbia change SIPs); Larman, supra note 1, at 610 (discussing EPA's action
to attempt to address problems that ozone transport presents). NO, contributes to
the production of ground-level ozone by reacting with VOCs. See Larman, supra
note 1, at 605. NO, is formed from fossil fuel combustion, particularly from
sources such as power plants, industrial boilers, and automobiles. See id.; see also
DeSalvo, supra note 1, at 358 (discussing principal sources of NO, emissions). In
20021
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C. Past Precedent
Prior to 1990, CAA section 7410(a) (2) (E) (i) required EPA to
call for SIP provisions that adequately prevented sources within
states from emitting air pollutants that would "prevent attainment
* . . [of air quality standards] by any other state. ' 34 Hearing cases
involving interstate disputes over regional ozone transport, the Sec-
ond and Sixth Circuits found minimal impacts allowable under the
previous statutory language.35
In Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County v. EPA,36 the
Sixth Circuit determined whether EPA violated CAA provisions that
prohibited a state's emissions from preventing attainment of
NAAQS in other states.37 While power plants located in Jefferson
County spent approximately $138 million removing sulfur dioxide
(S02) emissions, Gallagher Power Station (Gallagher), located just
across the river, faced absolutely no controls on SO 2 emissions. 38 As
a result of the disparity in emission limits between the power plants,
the Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County filed a peti-
tion for interstate pollution abatement. 39 Examining CAA's statu-
tory language, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the proper test
Congress intended was "whether one state 'significantly contrib-
utes' to NAAQS violations in another state."40 Applying a broad
interpretation of the test, the Sixth Circuit determined that Gal-
addition to environmental concerns, such as the loss of crop yields, acid rain, and
wide-spread forest damage, ozone is also responsible for serious respiratory health
concerns. See Larman, supra note 1, at 606.
34. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 674 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a) (2) (E) (i) (1982))
(mandating SIP provisions preventing nonattainment of NAAQS).
35. For a complete discussion on the Second and Sixth Circuit's decisions
under the previous statutory language, see infra notes 36-45 and accompanying
text.
36. 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984).
37. See id. at 1074. The Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
[hereinafter Jefferson County] sought relief upon its claim that emissions from
Gallagher Power Station [hereinafter Gallagher] violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a) (2) (E) (i) (Supp. V 1981). See id.
38. See id. at 1077. Louisville Gas and Electric, the chief producer of sulfur
dioxide [hereinafter S0 2 1 in Jefferson County, spent approximately $138 million
removing SO 2 emissions, while Gallagher's SO 2 emissions remained unregulated.
See id.
39. See id. The petition was filed pursuant to CAA § 7426. See id. Ultimately,
the petition called for more stringent controls with respect to Gallagher's emis-
sions. See id.
40. Id. at 1093. The Sixth Circuit quoted CAA § 7426(a) which provided that
all nearby states are entitled to notice of any new pollution source "which may
significantly contribute to levels of air pollution in excess of the national ambient
air quality standards in any air quality control region outside the state in which
such source intends to locate (or makes such modifications)." Id.
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol13/iss1/3
THE DIFFICULTY DOWNWIND
lagher did not violate the statute since it only contributed to three
percent of the pollutants that violated Jefferson County's NAAQS.4 1
Similarly, in Connecticut v. EPA,42 Petitioners claimed that EPA
failed to comply with CAA when it approved New York's SIP revi-
sion, allowing five power plants in Suffolk, New York, to continue
burning fuel with a 2.8% sulfur content.43 Connecticut maintained
that permitting the New York plants to continue burning high sul-
fur fuel would sufficiently impact the quality of Connecticut's air in
violation of CAA.44 The Second Circuit determined that there was
nothing in the legislative history of CAA section 7410 to indicate
that the statute was intended to prevent minimal impacts upon an-
other state's pollution where the affected state has not yet complied
with the NAAQS. 45
D. Consideration of Costs and Statutory Authority
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (NRDC),46 the D.C.
Circuit determined the extent of the EPA Administrator's authority
under CAA to set standards for carcinogenic pollutants with un-
known health effects. 47 NRDC argued that the Administrator was
required to consider only health-related factors under CAA section
7412 and must prohibit all emissions where there is uncertainty as
to the effects of a carcinogenic agent.48 The Administrator asserted
that in situations of uncertainty, he may set standards that reduce
emissions to the lowest level attainable by technology when that
41. See Jefferson County, 739 F.2d at 1093 (discussing how broad deference re-
quired to be accorded to EPA precluded disturbing EPA's determination).
42. 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982).
43. See id. at 151 (discussing factual history of Connecticut decision).
44. See id. at 153 (arguing EPA approval of New York's proposal would violate
CAA § 7410(a) (2) (E) and setting forth guidelines for EPA to assess interstate im-
pact of proposed SIP revisions).
45. See id. at 164. The Connecticut court agreed with EPA's analysis, which
stated that emissions from the New York power plants would have a minimal im-
pact on Connecticut's NAAQS. See id. at 163. The Second Circuit, also noted that
the power plants must comply with New York particulate regulations that are more
rigid than Connecticut's regulations. See id. at 163-64.
46. 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
47. See id. at 1147-48 (discussing regulation of vinyl chloride, a potent carcino-
gen used in manufacturing plastics).
48. See id. at 1147 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1) (B) (1982)). The court ex-
plained that CAA also calls for regulation of "air pollutant[s] to which no ambient
air quality standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator
cause[ ], or contribute[ ] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
result in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapaci-
tating reversible, illness." Id. at 1148 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1982)) (set-
ting forth regulation of hazardous air pollutants "to which no ambient air quality
standard is applicable . . ").
2002]
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level is shown to be safe for humans. 49 The D.C. Circuit held that
the Administrator is not permitted to consider cost and technologi-
cal feasibility when determining what is safe.50 The NRDC court de-
termined that since the statutory language mandates "an ample
margin of safety to protect public health," the Administrator is re-
quired to make an initial determination of what is safe based en-
tirely on health risks at particular levels before setting the emission
standard at the lowest technologically feasible level.51 The D.C. Cir-
cuit stated that the Administrator "cannot under any circumstances
consider cost and technological feasibility at this stage of the
analysis. "52
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,53 the United States Supreme Court upheld EPA's construction
of a CAA provision requiring EPA to establish regulations whereby
states must "require permits for the construction and operation of
new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution.54 In
promulgating the permit requirement, EPA allowed states to con-
sider all of the pollution-emitting devices within one industrial
49. See id. at 1147-48 (discussing EPA Administrator's inaccurate presump-
tion, with respect to CAA § 7412 (a)(1), that he may consider costs before health
concerns in determining safe levels of pollution).
50. See id. at 1166. Looking to the legislative history and statutory language,
the D.C. Circuit stated that it was "beyond dispute" that Congress' predominant
concern in promulgating § 112 was health. See id. at 1163. The NRDC court fur-
ther noted that in setting the emission standard for vinyl chloride, the Administra-
tor made no findings concerning health effects, safety, or the ability of the chosen
emission level to provide an "ample margin of safety." Id.
51. See NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1165 (stating consideration of cost and technology
have no relevance with respect to making initial determinations as to what is safe).
52. Id. at 1165. Acknowledging that Congress mandated EPA to provide "an
ample margin of safety" in order to safeguard public health, the NRDC court con-
cluded that EPA's initial determination must be based exclusively on the health
risks associated with certain emission levels. See id. at 1164; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(b) (1) (B) (1982) (mandating EPA to regulate hazardous pollutants by set-
ting emission standards at levels which provide ample margin of safety to protect
public health).
53. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. Id. at 840 n.1, 850 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6) (1977) (requiring "per-
mits for the construction and operation of... major secondary sources.... .")). In
1981, EPA promulgated regulations to implement permit requirements that
allow a State to adopt a plantwide definition of the term 'stationary
source,' under which an existing plant that contains several pollution-
emitting devices may install or modify one piece of equipment without
meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will not increase the total
emissions from the plant ....
Id. at 837.
[Vol. XIII: p. 93
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group, a single "bubble."5 5 The issue presented to the Chevron
Court was whether EPA permissibly construed the term "stationary
source."
56
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's holding, not-
ing that neither CAA nor its legislative history explicitly defined the
meaning of "stationary source. ' 57 The Supreme Court established a
two-pronged test for judicial review of an agency's statutory con-
struction.58 First, the reviewing court must determine whether
Congress has directly addressed the issue.59 If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, the court must give effect to the "unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. '60 The second prong mandates that,
where the statute is silent with respect to the question at issue, the
court must determine whether the agency's decision is "based on a
permissible construction of the statute. ' 61 Employing this analysis,
the Supreme Court held that EPA permissively construed the stat-
ute when it adopted the "bubble concept."62
Applying the Chevron analysis, the D.C. Circuit, in Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA,63 considered whether the EPA Administrator impermissibly
construed a CAA provision that governs the regulation of fuel addi-
55. See id. at 840. EPA permit regulations made it possible for states "to treat
all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though
they were encased within a single 'bubble.'" Id.
56. See id. (defining issue as flowing from statutory construction). "A 'station-
ary source' is any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may
emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." Id. at 840 n.2.
57. See id. at 841-42 (noting fundamental legal error of D.C. Circuit was that it
adopted "a static judicial definition of the term 'stationary source'" though Con-
gress had not ordered that definition).
58. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also United States v. ILCO, Inc., 996
F.2d 1126, 1130 (l1th Cir. 1993) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243) (stating "[i]f
Congress has clearly and directly spoken to the precise question at issue, effect
must be given to the expressed intent of Congress.")).
59. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243; see also Western Oil and Gas Ass'n v. EPA,
767 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying part two of Chevron two part test to EPA
construction of CAA).
60. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (setting forth part one of Chevron two part
test).
61. Id. at 843 (setting forth step two of Chevron test).
62. See id. at 866; see also Wagner Seed Co., Inc. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 925
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (affirming Chevron rule that EPA's statutory construction shall be
afforded deference where it is reasonable and Congressional intent is unclear);
American Legion v. Derwinski, 54 F.3d 789, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding defer-
ence to agency must be afforded as mandated by Chevron); ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1130
(affirming Chevron rule that reasonable agency determinations of unclear statutes
are to be afforded deference where statute is silent or ambiguous as to issue in
question); Western Oil, 767 F.2d at 606 (applying part two of Chevron two part test
to EPA's construction of CAA).
63. 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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tives. 6 4 The statute prohibits new fuel additives not "substantially
similar" to existing fuel additives from being introduced into com-
merce. 65 The statute also provides that if a manufacturer can
demonstrate that a new fuel additive will not contribute to noncom-
pliance of an emissions standard, the manufacturer may apply to
the Administrator for a waiver.66 The issue before the Ethyl Corp.
court was whether the EPA Administrator impermissibly construed
the statute by considering factors other than emission standards in
denying the waiver for the new fuel additive. 67
In reviewing EPA's construction of the statute, the Ethyl Corp.
court determined that Congress had in fact addressed the question
at issue.68 The D.C. Circuit determined that since the language of
the statute was unambiguous, the court was obligated to give effect
to "the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," which clearly
directed the Administrator to consider only emission effects in mak-
ing waiver determinations. 69
E. Nondelegation
The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of nondelegation with re-
spect to CAA in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA.70 The
64. See id. at 1054 (enunciating Ethyl Corp.'s central issue).
65. See id. (discussing prohibitions on new fuel additives introduced into com-
merce); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (governing regula-
tion of fuel additives).
66. See Ethyl Corp., 51 F.3d at 1054 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(0(4) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)) (setting forth conditions under which fuel additive manufacturers
may apply to EPA Administrator for waiver).
67. See id. at 1054. Although the statutory provision called for the Administra-
tor to consider emission effects of the new fuel additive in making waiver determi-
nations, the Administrator also considered other factors, including health effects.
See id. at 1055.
68. See id. at 1058. Examining relevant statutory language, the Ethyl court de-
termined that the provision clearly directed the Administrator to consider only
emission effects in making waiver determinations. See id.
69. Id. at 1058 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984) (stating court's obligation to adhere to "the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.")).
70. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (addressing nondelegation issue with re-
spect to CAA), affjd in part, rev'd in part, remanded by Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001). The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit's
holding that CAA § 7409(b)(1) unambiguously barred cost considerations in set-
ting NAAQS. See id. at 919. However, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of
the holding that remanded the issue back to EPA for a "reinterpretation that
would avoid a supposed delegation of legislative power." Id. 912-14. The Court
argued that an agency interpretation of a statute could not constitute an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power. See id. at 912. The Court stated, "[I]n a
delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has dele-
gated legislative power to the agency." Id.; see also A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (addressing issue of whether Code of Fair Com-
12
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American Trucking court considered whether EPA's Final Rule modi-
fying NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter was based on a con-
struction that amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.7' In setting NAAQS, EPA examined the severity
of health effects, the size of the population affected, and the cer-
tainty of effect.72 While the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that these
factors alone posed no intrinsic nondelegation issue, EPA failed to
articulate any intelligible standard for establishing its ozone and
particulate matter limits. 73 Noting that EPA's construction of CAA
allowed it to set NAAQS between zero and any point that would
yield "killer fog," the D.C. Circuit held that EPA's construction ef-
fected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.74
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Michigan v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit addressed whether EPA's
construction of significant contribution under CAA section
7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) was proper.75 In making its determination,
the Michigan court addressed several issues pertaining to whether
the use of cost-effectiveness as a determination for significance vio-
lated section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I).76
A. Determining Significant Contribution
In concluding EPA was within its statutory authority, the Michi-
gan court addressed the four arguments advanced by State Petition-
petition for Live Poultry Industry of New York City Metropolitan Area had been
adopted pursuant to unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (considering whether National Indus-
trial Recovery Act was "an unconstitutional delegation to the President of legisla-
tive power... transcending the authority of Congress .... ).
71. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034 (discussing EPA's Final Rule which
revised primary and secondary NAAQS for particulate matter and ozone).
72. See id. at 1035 (discussing National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883 (1997)).
73. See id. at 1034 (stating that EPA lacks "any determinate criterion" for es-
tablishing its limits).
74. See id. at 1034-35, 1037 (holding EPA's determination of policy judgment
unconstitutional); see also Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 495 (holding code-mak-
ing authority was unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it was
immensely broad); Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 388 (holding "the wide range
of administrative authority... cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the
authority to delegate.").
75. See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 674-81 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (looking to past
precedent, consideration of costs, uniform controls, and nondelegation to deter-
mine whether EPA's evaluation of "contribute significantly" was proper).
76. See id. at 671-81 (addressing whether EPA's cost-effectiveness analysis vio-
lated CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I)).
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ers: (1) EPA did not act in accordance with precedent; (2) EPA
impermissibly considered cost-effectiveness; (3) EPA irrationally re-
quired uniform NO,, controls on the states; and (4) EPA's determi-
nation violated the nondelegation doctrine.77
1. Past Precedent
In their argument concerning past precedent, State Petitioners
asserted that cases such as Jefferson County and Connecticut, hinging
on the statutory standard in place prior to the 1990 CAA Amend-
ments, barred EPA from considering emissions in the instant case
as "significant" within the meaning of section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i)
(I).78 The previous standard, on which Jefferson County and Connecti-
cut were based, contained the phrase "prevent attainment. '79 In
these cases, the Second and Sixth Circuits upheld EPA's conclusion
that emissions from upwind states, which impacted downwind states
more than the impacts involved in the instant case, were not sub-
stantial enough to prevent attainment.80 Essentially, Petitioners' ar-
gument equated the previous standard, "prevent attainment," with
the new standard, "contribute significantly to nonattainment."8'
Noting that Jefferson County and Connecticut were based on S02
emissions rather than NO, emissions, the D.C. Circuit determined
that EPA did not bind itself to any particular criterion under the
old standard and that nothing in the language of the 1990 Amend-
ments to the statute provided any criteria for classifying emissions
as "significant."8 2 The Michigan court held that Petitioners' claim
77. See id. at 674 (discussing Petitioners' challenges to EPA's construction of
"contribute significantly.").
78. See id. at 674 (discussing Petitioners' argument against EPA's Final Rule
regarding past precedent).
79. See id. The D.C. Circuit stated that, prior to the 1990 Amendments, CAA
§ 7410(a) (2) (E) (I) required EPA to ensure that SIPs contained provisions pre-
cluding emissions that "prevent attainment or maintenance" of NAAQS. Id. (cit-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1982)).
80. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 674 (discussing previous EPA decisions based on
CAA prior to 1990 Amendments). For a complete discussion of cases involving
previous EPA decisions based on CAA prior to the 1990 Amendments, see supra
notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
81. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 674 (discussing state Petitioners' arguments regard-
ing prior provisions of CAA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (E) (1982) (setting
forth regulations prescribing primary and secondary NAAQS).
82. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 674 (distinguishing Michigan from both Jefferson
County and Connecticut).
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fell short since it failed to identify any previous adoption of a bind-
ing standard by EPA.83
2. Consideration of Costs
In consideration of Petitioners' argument that EPA impermissi-
bly considered cost-effectiveness in its determination, the D.C. Cir-
cuit first looked to the statutory language of section 7410(a) (2)
(D) (i) (I).84 The D.C. Circuit noted that the term "significant" does
not convey "unidimensionality" and, therefore, does not convey an
exclusive consideration of health effects.8 5 The Michigan court
then stated that Petitioners failed to provide an alternative analysis
whereby EPA could determine "significance" considering only
health factors.86
Relying on NRDC, Petitioners argued that EPA was precluded
from considering cost-effectiveness as a primary factor for deter-
mining significant contribution under section 7410(a) (2) (D)
(i) (I).87 The D.C. Circuit concluded that while its decision in
NRDC acknowledged that the statutory language and legislative his-
tory provided little support for the consideration of costs absent a
"clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost," EPA
was not barred from applying costs.88 The Michigan court upheld
EPA's decision pursuant to the notion that there must be a clear
congressional intent to preclude the consideration of costs.89
3. Uniform Controls
With respect to the issue of uniform controls, the Michigan
court considered two principal arguments set forth by Petitioners. 90
83. See id. (concluding Petitioners' claim inadequate since EPA never adopted
binding concept of how much emissions activity was too much under CAA
§ 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I)).
84. See id. at 674 (discussing Petitioners' claim that CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i)
(1) does not authorize EPA to consider cost of ozone reduction).
85. See id. at 677 (discussing Petitioners' claim that "significant" connotes
"unidimensionality" in measuring factors deemed "significant").
86. See id. at 678. Petitioners stressed that EPA is required to "establish a defi-
nition of significance that is dominated by air quality factors, as air quality is the
sole factor mentioned in the statute." Id. at 776 (quoting Reply Brief of Petition-
ing States, page 4).
87. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 674 (discussing Petitioners' claim with respect to
EPA's cost considerations).
88. Id. at 678 (citing NRDC, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
89. See id. (stating preclusion of costs requires "express congressional
direction.").
90. See id. at 679 (discussing Petitioners' claim that EPA's uniform control
strategy is irrational in two respects).
20021
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Petitioners first contended that, under the EPA Final Rule, regard-
less of the amount of contribution from a particular state, EPA irra-
tionally required all twenty-three regions to employ uniform
controls by mandating that they "reduce their NO,, by an amount
achievable with 'highly cost-effective controls."' 91 The Michigan
court maintained that its decision to uphold EPA's cost-effective-
ness analysis necessitated allowing such a consequence. 92
Petitioners next asserted that EPA should have imposed more
costly reductions for emissions originating from sources located
closer to nonattainment areas than sources located further away.93
Relying on EPA methodology, the Michigan court concluded that,
by comparison, EPA's non-uniform regional approaches did not
"provide either a significant improvement in air quality or a sub-
stantial reduction in cost."'9 4 Noting that Petitioners failed to pro-
vide a critical analysis of EPA's methodology, which independent
investigators corroborated, the D.C. Circuit held it had no basis to
disturb EPA's findings. 95
4. Nondelegation
Relying primarily on the D.C. Circuit's holding in American
Trucking, Petitioners argued that EPA's Final Rule violated the
nondelegation doctrine. 96 Because nothing in EPA's analysis clari-
fied how much NO, contribution was substantial enough to qualify
for a SIP call, Petitioners averred that EPA's construction of "con-
tribute significantly" was not "based on any intelligible princi-
ples."97 While the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that EPA's cost-
91. Id. Petitioners claimed that despite considerable differences in contribu-
tions to downwind nonattainment, even small contributors must reduce emissions
"equivalent to those achievable by highly cost-effective measures." Id.
92. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 679. The D.C. Circuit concluded that its decision to
uphold EPA's determination to base "significant contribution" on cost differentials
logically entailed upholding the consequence of uniform controls. See id.
93. See id. (clarifying Petitioners' second argument against uniform controls).
94. Id. (quoting Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,423) (evaluating EPA's meth-
odology and regional approaches to air quality and cost reduction).
95. See id. at 679-80. The D.C. Circuit looked to an independent investigator
which confirmed EPA's methodology, stating "there was no clear benefit to an
exposure-based trading system, compared with simple ton-for-ton NO, trading."
Id. at 679-80 (quoting Krupnick & Anderson, A Dilemma Downwind, 137 RESOURCES
FOR THE Fu-ruRE 5, 6 (1999)).
96. See id. at 680 (discussing Petitioners' nondelegation argument); see gener-
ally American Trucking, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999). For a further discussion of
American Trucking facts, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
97. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 680. The D.C. Circuit explained that Petitioners'
argument for nondelegation centered on the fact that EPA's analysis did not ex-
plain where the line to establish significant contribution would be drawn. See id.
16
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effectiveness analysis was a "radically incomplete line-drawing de-
vice," the Michigan court asserted that the statute contained certain
threshold limitations which confined the reach of the statute to "a
modest role."98 The D.C. Circuit maintained that a number of
cases, including American Trucking, have upheld delegations of
standardless discretion on the premise that such discretion could
only be narrowly deployed by agencies.99 The Michigan court con-
sequently determined that because the threshold criteria required
under the statute effectively limited EPA's authority, American Truck-
ing was distinguishable from the instant case.100 Resting on these
principles, the Michigan court held that EPA's decision did not vio-
late the nondelegation doctrine. 101
B. The Dissent
In accordance with Petitioners' argument, Circuit Judge Sen-
telle offered the sole dissenting opinion in Michigan.10 2 Judge Sen-
telle contended that EPA did not have the statutory authority to
consider costs under section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I).103 The dissent
stated that because EPA lacked the statutory authority to consider
costs, the majority's analysis should not have addressed the other
considerations set forth in the controversy. 10 4
98. Id. The D.C. Circuit listed three threshold considerations that EPA must
make before assessing "significance" according to CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I). See
id. First, EPA must find that emissions activity exists within a particular state. See
id. Second, EPA must demonstrate that such emissions are migrating into other
areas. See id. Finally, EPA must show that such emissions contribute to nonattain-
ment. See id.
99. See id. at 680 (citing American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1037) (holding EPA's
Final Rule modifying NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter created unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power); see also International Union, UAW v. OSHA
("Lockout/Tagout I"), 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting scope of agency's
"claimed power to roam was immense, encompassing all American enterprise.");
Synar v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 1374, 1383 (D.D.C. 1986) (three-judge panel),
affd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (stating "[w]hen the scope
increases to immense proportions.., the standards must be correspondingly more
precise.").
100. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 680-81 (discussing threshold determinations
EPA must make before assessing significance).
101. See id. at 681 (holding EPA's decision was not based on intelligible
principles).
102. See id. at 695-97 (agreeing with Petitioners that EPA undeniably ex-
ceeded its statutory authority).
103. See id. at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that statutory language
does not confer upon EPA authority to consider costs).
104. See id. (discussing majority's complex and extensive opinion and declin-
ing to address any subsidiary issues).
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Judge Sentelle asserted that while Congress provided one crite-
rion for determining whether emissions "contribute significantly to
nonattainment" in downwind states, EPA impermissibly adopted a
separate criterion. 10 5 Looking to the Ethyl Corp. decision barring
EPA's consideration of other criterion where the plain language of
a statutory provision clearly identifies the criterion to be used,
Judge Sentelle questioned why the instant controversy did not "fall
squarely within the four corners of... Ethyl Corp."106
Referring to the statutory language, the dissent argued that
Congress clearly authorized EPA to base its findings on amounts of
pollutants "measured in terms of significance of contribution to
downwind nonattainment," rather than costs of alleviation. l07 The
dissent further contended that the majority incorrectly separated
"significantly" from "contribute," resulting in the majority's disre-
gard for the statutory language of section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) dis-
cussing "amounts" of "air pollutants" that "contribute significantly"
to nonattainment. 108 Finally, looking to Chevron, the dissent as-
serted that the majority failed to properly reach the second prong
of the Chevron analysis since neither EPA nor the majority offered
any sensible interpretation of the statute relating cost-effectiveness
to its language.10 9
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
The Michigan court's holding that EPA properly interpreted
"contribute significantly" under CAA section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) is
erroneous in several respects. 110 First, the Michigan court incor-
rectly held that EPA acted in accordance with past precedent."'
Next, the Michigan court wrongly found EPA's consideration of
105. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that while
Congress set forth one criterion, EPA impermissibly adopted another criterion).
106. Id. (noting similarities between Michigan and Ethyl Corp.). For a further
discussion on the Ethyl Corp. holding, see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
107. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1994)) (noting EPA based its findings on considerations
Congress did not authorize).
108. Id. Examining the statutory language of CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), the
dissent asserted that "no reasonable reading of the statutory provision in its en-
tirety allows the term significantly to springboard costs of alleviation into EPA's
statutorily defined authority." Id.
109. Id. at 697. For a complete discussion on the Chevron court's analysis, see
supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
110. For a further discussion of the Michigan court's holding regarding EPA's
determination of "contribute significantly" under CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), see
infta notes 115-61 and accompanying text.
111. For a further discussion of the Michigan court's holding on past prece-
dent, see infra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
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costs was permissible under section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I). 112 Addi-
tionally, the Michigan court improperly found that EPA's uniform
NO, controls imposed on the states were not irrational. 1 3 Finally,
the Michigan court erroneously held that EPA's determination was
based on intelligible principles. 114
A. Past Precedent
The D.C. Circuit inappropriately held that EPA's interpreta-
tion of "contribute significantly" was correct with respect to past
precedent. The two main principles on which the court distin-
guished Jefferson County and Connecticut were erroneous under the
statutory language of section 7410(a)(2) (D) (i) (I).115 First, the
Michigan court inappropriately contended that past precedent was
never established because EPA did not bind itself to any particular
criterion. 1 6 Secondly, the court inappropriately concluded that
the amended provision provided no criterion. 117
While the Michigan court stated that EPA did not bind itself to
a particular criterion under the previous statutory language, the
court overlooked the fact that EPA based its decisions in Jefferson
County and Connecticut on amounts of pollutants.1 18 Both Jefferson
County and Connecticut established that EPA understood that its de-
112. For a further discussion of the Michigan court's decision that EPA's cost
considerations are permissible under CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), see infra notes
128-46 and accompanying text.
113. For a further discussion of the Michigan court's decision that uniform
NO, controls imposed upon states were not irrational, see infra notes 147-52 and
accompanying text.
114. For a further discussion of the Michigan court's finding that EPA's deter-
mination was based upon intelligible principles, see infra notes 153-61 and accom-
panying text.
115. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 674. For a complete discussion on the Michigan
court's analysis of the Jefferson County and Connecticut decisions, see supra notes 116-
27 and accompanying text.
116. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 674 (discussing whether EPA bound itself to any
criteria).
117. See id.
118. See Jefferson County, 739 F.2d at 1071, 1078 (6th Cir. 1984). EPA ex-
amined emissions from Gallagher by performing modeling studies in order to de-
termine whether the percentage of SO 2 emissions was significant enough to have
caused or substantially contributed to NAAQS violations in Kentucky. See id.; see
also Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1982). EPA used statistical mod-
eling to determine whether the percentage of SO2 emitted from power plants in
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termination of whether emissions from one state prevent attain-
ment in other states must be based on amounts of pollutants. 119
The plain language of the amended provision of section
7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) likewise provides that EPA must base its deter-
mination on amounts of pollutants. 120 As the dissent correctly
demonstrated, the amended section provides that EPA shall pre-
vent states from emitting "pollutant[s] in amounts which will ...
contribute significantly to nonattainment."121 Accordingly, the
D.C. Circuit incorrectly concluded that the amended provision pro-
vided no criterion. 122
In distinguishing Jefferson County and Connecticut from the in-
stant case, the D.C. Circuit implied that Petitioners incorrectly
equated the former statutory standard of "prevent attainment" with
the present standard of "contribute significantly to nonattain-
ment."123 Although Jefferson County based its decision on the lan-
guage of the previous statutory provision, the Sixth Circuit adopted
a test similar to that dictated by the current language of section
7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I).124 Examining CAA statutory language, theJef-
ferson County court based its holding on whether emissions from
one state "significantly contributed" to NAAQS violations in differ-
119. See Jefferson County, 739 F.2d at 1077 (discussing EPA's analysis of SO
emissions under 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (e) (Supp. V 1981)); see also Connecticut,
696 F.2d at 147 (arguing EPA's analysis of SO emissions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a) (2) (E) (i) (Supp. IV 1980)).
120. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 695-97 (Sentelle, J. dissenting) (stating CAA
§ 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) empowers EPA to base its decision on amounts of pollu-
tants); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) (1994) (stating EPA must police
SIPs to ensure that they contain adequate provisions that will prohibit sources
within States from emitting "pollutants in amounts which will... contribute signifi-
candy to nonattainment.").
121. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 695 (Sentelle, J. dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) (1994)).
122. See id. at 695-97. The dissenting opinion in Michigan concluded the ma-
jority incorrectly held that CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) provides no criteria for de-
termining whether a state's contribution to another state's nonattainment is
significant. See id. at 696. For a further discussion of the dissenting opinion, see
supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
123. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 674. The Michigan court also noted that "given
EPA's finding as to the cumulative effects of the pollutants that generate ozone,
EPA might well be able to distinguish this case from the sulfur dioxide cases that
states have cited." Id.
124. See Jefferson County, 739 F.2d at 1093 (determining proper test Congress
intended under CAA § 7426(a) was "whether one state 'significantly contributes'
to NAAQS violations in another state."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7426(a) (Supp. V
1981) (requiring written notice of any new source of pollution to closely situated
states).
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ent states. 1 25 Similarly, in Connecticut, the Second Circuit rejected a
literal reading of the word "prevent" under the previous statutory
language, implying that the burden of proof on Petitioners would
be too great. 12 6 Based on the interpretation of the previous statu-
tory language set forth by the Second and Sixth Circuits, Petitioners
in Michigan were in fact correct in equating the two provisions.12 7
B. Consideration of Costs
The D.C. Circuit applied an inadequate analysis to the statu-
tory language of section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) and to prior holdings
in its decision that EPA's consideration of costs was permissible.1 2 8
The Michigan court reasoned that because the term "significant"
does not convey a unidimensional measure, EPA was not bound to
any particular type of assessment. 129 This conclusion is flawed be-
cause it effectively dissociates the adverb "significantly" from the
verb it modifies, "contributes. 1 30 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit
failed to acknowledge that the statute permits EPA to look for that
which is being contributed, namely "an amount of an air pollu-
tant." 131 By isolating the term "significantly" and failing to consider
other terms provided for in the statute, the court grants EPA au-
125. See Jefferson County, 739 F.2d at 1093 (holding power plant contributing
three percent of pollutants violating Jefferson County's NAAQS did not signifi-
cantly contribute under CAA § 7426). For a further discussion on Jefferson County,
see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
126. See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating EPA
properly rejected literal interpretation of CAA § 7410(a) (2) (E) (i) (I) (Supp. IV
1980)).
127. For a complete discussion of Petitioners' Jefferson County and Connecticut
arguments, see supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
128. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 696 (Sentelle,J., dissenting). The Michigan dis-
sent concluded that both the majority and EPA clearly contorted the language of
CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) in order to justify cost considerations under the stat-
ute. See id.; see also NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding
cost considerations impermissible when determining what is safe); Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding courts must give effect to "the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
129. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 677. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the
term "significant" would be an odd term for Congress to choose in order to ex-
press unidimensionality. See id. The Court referred to the phrase "significant
other" to support its reasoning. See id.
130. See id. at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Dissenting Judge Sentelle stated,
"I marvel at an interpretation that permits cost effectiveness to find a place in a
statutory provision addressing amounts of air pollutant contribution." Id.
131. See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion noted that the
majority disregarded the fact that the statute authorizes EPA to address that which
is being "contribut[ed] significantly." Id. The dissent then explained that Con-
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thority that was not expressly provided for in section
7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I).132
Accordingly, Michigan is inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit's
reasoning set forth in NRDC.133 Although the holding in NRDC did
not preclude EPA from considering costs, it clearly prohibited EPA
from making its determination based on costs when the statutory
language identifies a principal criterion. 134 As the dissenting opin-
ion in Michigan demonstrated, the solitary criterion Congress set
forth in section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) was "amounts of pollutants." 135
Because the provision contains no requisite "clear congressional in-
tent to preclude consideration of cost .. . ," EPA is barred from
employing cost-effectiveness as its chief consideration under
NRDC.136
Moreover, in light of the D.C. Circuit's holding in Ethyl Corp.,
its holding in Michigan was improper. 137 The crux of the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision in Ethyl Corp. rested on the notion that when plain
statutory language clearly indicates that "'decisions are to be based
on one criterion, [ ] EPA cannot base its decision on other crite-
ria."' 1 38 In section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), Congress provided a crite-
rion based on amounts of air pollutants. 3 9 Nonetheless, EPA
disregarded this standard and applied a "cost-effectiveness of allevi-
ation" criterion. 40 By allowing EPA to apply a criterion that does
132. See id. at 695 (Sentelle,J., dissenting) (agreeing with Petitioners that EPA
has undeniably "exceeded its statutory authority.").
133. See id. at 678-79. For a discussion of the Michigan court's holding with
respect to NRDC, see supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
134. SeeNRDCv. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating cost con-
siderations are relevant in determining what is safe).
135. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that Con-
gress has set forth one criterion in form of amounts of pollutants that contribute
significantly to nonattainment in downwind states).
136. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1163. While the NRDCcourt allowed EPA to consider
costs, it recognized that when Congress provides a principal criterion, EPA is flatly
barred from basing its analysis on cost considerations. See id. at 1164-65.
137. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The dissent con-
cluded, "I would remind the agency once more of the lessons of... Ethyl Corp.,
allow the petitions for review, and end the case." Id.
138. See id. at 696 (Sentelle,J., dissenting) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d
1053, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (holding EPA must not base its decision regarding air
pollutants on criteria other than that provided in statutory provision).
139. See id. (stating Congress clearly provided that EPA decisions under CAA
§ 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) are to be based on amounts of air pollutants); see also 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) (1994) (setting forth regulations prescribing primary
and secondary NAAQS).
140. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 674-79. For a further discussion of EPA's cost-
effectiveness analysis, see supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XIII: p. 93
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not exist in the statutory language, the D.C. Circuit incorrectly ap-
plied its own rule. 14 1
Similarly, the Michigan court's holding inappropriately impli-
cated an analysis under the second prong of the Chevron test.' 42
The Michigan court's conclusion implied that EPA is free to base its
decision on cost-effectiveness insofar as Congress has not explicitly
prohibited such an analysis. 143  Congress' intent in section
7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) is apparent; EPA must base its decision on
amounts of pollutants that "contribute significantly to nonattain-
ment" in downwind states. 144 Although Congress did not define
significant contribution or amount, neither EPA nor the Michigan
court provided a reasonable interpretation that justified EPA's use
of cost-effectiveness. 45 To compel application of the second prong
of the Chevron test whenever a statutory provision does not explicitly
prohibit an asserted legislative power is inconsistent with estab-
lished precedent recognized by the D.C. Circuit.146
C. Uniform Controls
Because EPA's regulatory scheme was erroneously based on
cost considerations, it should have been overruled at the outset and
the Michigan court's analysis should not have reached such subsidi-
ary issues as uniform controls. 14 7 Upholding EPA's uniform con-
trols decision, the D.C. Circuit determined that its decision to allow
EPA to consider cost-effectiveness necessitated the requirement
141. Id. at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion stated that
"the present controversy falls squarely within the four corners of... Ethyl Corp." Id.
Therefore, according to the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Ethyl Corp., EPA should not
have been permitted to consider costs. See id. For a complete discussion of the
Ethyl Corp. holding, see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
142. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 697 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating nothing in
Chevron supports Michigan result). For a complete discussion of the Chevron hold-
ing, see supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
143. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 697 (Sentelle,J., dissenting) (stating EPA's posi-
tion essentially implies that EPA may use any criteria not expressly forbidden by
Congress).
144. See id. at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating both EPA and Michigan
majority failed to offer any reasonable interpretation of statutory language which
enabled them to depend upon or even relate to cost-effectiveness of alleviation).
145. See id. at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating, "I marvel at an interpreta-
tion that permits cost-effectiveness to find a place in a statutory provision address-
ing amounts of air pollutant contribution.").
146. See id. at 697 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that when statutory lan-
guage is unambiguous " 'EPA cannot base its decision on other criteria,' even on a
criterion as laudable as the health of the public.").
147. See id. at 697 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Sentelle refused to address subsidiary issues discussed in the majority opinion in
light of EPA's unfounded regulatory scheme. See id.
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that all twenty-three jurisdictions uniformly reduce their NOx emis-
sions utilizing "highly cost-effective controls."1 48 Because the Michi-
gan court reached its conclusion based on principles that run
contrary to the clear language of section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), as
well as the established principles set forth in NRDC, Ethyl Corp. and
Chevron, the issue of uniform controls is consequently obsolete.1 49
Petitioners provided no critical analysis of EPA's methodology with
respect to EPA's construction of the statutory provision on which
EPA based its methodology.1 50 Nevertheless, the established case
law of NtDC, Ethyl Corp. and Chevron clearly prohibits EPA from
basing its consideration on costs. 151 Consequently, because EPA
based its findings on impermissible criteria, the issue of uniform
controls should be nullified. 152
D. Nondelegation
While the Michigan court was correct in its determination that
EPA did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, it inappropriately
concluded that EPA's cost-effectiveness analysis was based on intelli-
gible principles. 153 Indeed, Congress expressly provided an intelli-
gible principle in section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), amounts of pollu-
148. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 679 (stating uniform controls "flow[ ] inelucta-
bly from EPA's decision to draw 'significant contribution' line on basis of cost
differentials.").
149. See id. at 695 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (emphasizing EPA, as federal
agency, "has no constitutional or common law existence or authority, but only
those authorities conferred upon it by Congress."). For a complete discussion of
the Michigan court's analysis of NRDC, Ethyl Corp., and Chevron, see supra notes 128-
46 and accompanying text.
150. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 679 (noting that state petitioners provided "no
material critique of EPA's methodology.").
151. See id. at 696 (SentelleJ., dissenting). Evaluating relevant case law, such
as Ethyl Corp., the dissent averred that the Michigan court's analysis contradicted
past precedent. See id. The dissenting opinion also concluded that, in light of the
lessons of cases like Ethyl Corp., the Michigan court should not have permitted
EPA's cost-effectiveness analysis and, therefore, should have ended its analysis with-
out addressing any subsidiary issues. See id. at 697.
152. See id. at 697 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (refusing to address subsidiary
issues).
153. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 912 (2001) (stat-
ing "[i]n a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute
has delegated legislative power to the agency.").
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tants.154 However, EPA based its determination on a principle not
provided for in the statute, cost-effectiveness. 5 5
The Michigan court acknowledged that EPA "neither rest[ed]
[its] benchmark on anything in the language or function of [sec-
tion 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I)], nor otherwise explains why the resulting
cut-off point represents the right degree of 'cost-effectiveness."' "156
Moreover, the Michigan court appropriately recognized that EPA's
cost-effectiveness analysis was "a radically incomplete line-drawing
device," yet, the court concluded that such lack of discretion was
distinguishable from cases such as American Trucking.15 7 The D.C.
Circuit based this distinction on the flawed premise that EPA's dis-
cretion under section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) could only be deployed
in a "narrower scope."'5 " Nonetheless, the court admitted that the
provision nominally "encompasses 'all American enterprise."' 159
The Michigan court determined that the "threshold determina-
tions" that EPA must make before assessing "significance," tended
to confine EPA's activity under the statute. 1 60 Although these
threshold criteria establish which states contribute to nonattain-
ment, as the Michigan court recognized, EPA's cost-effectiveness
analysis for determining significance remains radically
incomplete. 161
VI. IMPACT
The implications of the Michigan court's decision to allow EPA
to consider costs in promulgating CAA section 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I)
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1994) (requiring SIPs to include
provisions prohibiting "any source . .. of emissions activity within the State from
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . .contribute significantly to
nonattainment in, . . .any other State . .. ").
155. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,356 (requiring twenty-three jurisdictions
to reduce No. emissions by amount that can be achieved for less than $2,000 dol-
lars per ton).
156. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 680 (questioning relationship between designated
cut-off point and level of cost-effectiveness).
157. Id. (stating EPA's determination of cut-off point was "essentially
unbounded.").
158. See id. While the Michigan court emphasized the narrow scope to which
EPA is limited when employing CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I), it noted that "[n]early
half the nation is affected and control costs will be substantial." Id.
159. Id. (recognizing broad reach of CAA § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I)).
160. See id. at 680-81. The Michigan court referred to threshold criteria re-
quiring EPA to determine emissions activity exists within a state, such emissions
migrate into downwind states and the emissions contribute to nonattainment. See
id. at 680.
161. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 680-81 (stating EPA's cost-effectiveness analysis
is radically incomplete in establishing how much NO, is worthy of SIP call).
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are multifaceted. While the ultimate effects of the decision with
respect to the problem of ozone transport remain to be seen, the
immediate impact is that EPA's authority under section
7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) has been greatly expanded beyond the scope
intended by Congress. 162
While EPA has reached its determination in pursuit of a goal as
commendable as clean air, it is fundamental that the agency's
power to enforce legislative regulation is restricted to the authority
expressly delegated by Congress. 163 As the D.C. Circuit previously
recognized in Ethyl Corp., "[w] ere courts to presume a delegation of
power absent an express withholding of such power, agencies
would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of
keeping with Chevron and quite likely with the Constitution as
well."' 6 4 Indeed, with the holding of the Michigan court, the D.C.
Circuit has consequently realized its own fears. 165 Because the
Michigan court's decision to allow EPA to consider costs under sec-
tion 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) expands EPA's authority under the provi-
sion, so long as the scope of EPA's discretion under the statute
remains unchecked, "the dam constituted by these criteria will
burst."166
Erika Jean Doyle
162. See id. at 696 (Sentelle,J., dissenting) (concluding Michigan court's analy-
sis contorted statutory language in order to justify applying cost considerations).
163. See id. at 695-96 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (discussing American Petroleum's
warning to EPA that its power is limited to what Congress has delegated to it).
164. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining dan-
gers associated with government agencies that overstep boundaries) (emphasis
omitted).
165. For a complete discussion of the propriety of the Michigan court's hold-
ing, see supra notes 115-61 and accompanying text.
166. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 680-81 (observing substantial costs of pollution
controls and far reaching effects of EPA's decision).
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